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Culture from humans to nonhuman animals 
Culture in humans connotes tradition, norms, ritual, technology, and social learning, but also 
cultural events like operas or gallery openings. Culture is in part about what we do, but also 
sometimes about what we ought to do. Human culture is inextricably intertwined with language 
and much of what we learn and transmit to others comes through written or spoken language. 
Given the complexities of human culture, it might seem that we are the only species that exhibits 
culture. 
How, then, are we to make sense of culture in animals?1 The study of animal culture is a 
booming research area. Culture is said to occur in a wide range of vertebrates from our close kin, 
chimpanzees (Whiten et al. 1999) and orangutans (van Schaik et al. 2003), to more distant 
relatives like rats (Galef and Aleen 1995) and whales (Whitehead and Rendell 2015). Could 
these studies be misleading in that they are not actually studying culture but simply misapplying 
the term ‘culture’? Or is what is labeled culture in animals at the core of human culture, so that 
although human culture is more elaborate than animal culture, it is different in degree, not kind? 
While it is certainly easy to intentionally define culture in a way that makes it unique to humans, 
because of the growing field of animal culture, it would be most useful to attempt to offer a 
definition of culture that makes sense of how it is used by psychologists, biologists, 
anthropologists, and others who use the term culture in studies of animal behavior. The challenge 
is to produce a concept that is broad enough to be able to apply across humans and animals, but 
not be so anemic that it cannot do justice to human culture. Because of this, I will here construct 
a definition of animal culture and draw out some of its implications. Let’s begin by considering 
what ingredients should go into such a definition.  
																																																						
1	Nonhuman animals, that is—I will for simplicity use ‘animals’ to denote nonhuman animals.	
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Ingredients for a definition of culture 
Anthropology has a long tradition of proposing definitions of culture. Kroeber and Kluckhohn 
(1952) tallied 164 definitions, and many more have been added in the subsequent half century. 
Some of the definitions of culture focus on cultural products, like Tyler’s (1871) understanding 
of culture as a “complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and 
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (1). Others focus on 
social learning or heredity: “culture means the social heredity of mankind” (Linton 1936: 78). 
Still others define culture not in terms of outcomes, but instead in terms of the information that 
governs behavior and helps create cultural products: “culture is best seen not as complexes of 
concrete behavior patterns—customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters—as has, by and large, 
been the case up to now, but a set of control mechanisms—plans, recipes, rules, instructions 
(what computer engineers call “programs”)—for the governing of behavior” (Geertz 1973: 44). 
 Given this diversity of definitions, should we sift through them and try to determine 
which one is correct? I am inclined not to attempt to pick out the correct one(s), casting others 
aside. Instead, most of the definitions get at important features of culture. Culture is a form of 
social heredity, it is something that governs behavior, and it is something that forms the basis of 
traditions and artifacts. The challenge is not to find the right (or best) definition from those 
available, but to pick out the essential ingredients of culture and then figure out how to put them 
together to produce a synthetic definition of culture. Kroeber and Kluckhohn attempted to do just 
that when they proposed that culture “consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for 
behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human 
groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of 
traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; 
culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other hand, as 
conditioning elements of further action” (1952: 357). Their definition has the merit of trying to 
put together important ingredients, but it is of little help for animal culture since it defines culture 
in terms of humans. And while human culture is clearly highly symbolic and value-laden, these 
features do not seem to be necessary conditions of culture. For producing the ingredients for a 
synthetic definition of animal culture, let’s consider how animal culture is often understood. 
In animal behavior studies, culture often has a negative, operational definition: If there is 
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a behavioral difference across populations that is not explainable in terms of environmental or 
genetic differences, then it can be attributed to culture. But culture is sometimes given explicit 
positive definitions as well, for example, “a cultural behaviour is one that is transmitted 
repeatedly through social or observational learning to become a population-level characteristic” 
(Whiten et al. 1999: 682). Note that this is not so much a definition of culture, but instead a 
characterization of a prototypical result of culture. As such, it features characteristics that are 
commonly associated with culture, like being population-wide, but not necessarily ones we 
should use as a base for a definition of culture. Similarly, although many genes are homogeneous 
across populations, it would be misleading to define what genes are in terms of population-level 
phenotypic characteristics. 
 Defining culture in terms of outcomes like traditions or group typicality is widespread in 
the animal culture literature. For example, Allen et al. (2013: 485) define culture in terms of 
“shared behavior propagated by social learning,” and Laland and Janik (2006: 524) understand 
“culture (or tradition) as all group-typical behaviour patterns, shared by members of animal 
communities, that are to some degree reliant on socially learned and transmitted information.” 
To understand the various components of the way animal culture is commonly defined in the 
literature, let’s unpack Laland and Janik’s definition.  
 Laland and Janik’s definition utilizes three main ingredients. One is an outcome, a 
“group-typical behaviour pattern.” Not all behavioral group typicality is cultural, of course, but 
as they have defined culture, group typicality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
culture. The second ingredient is a mechanism; the behaviors are in part due to the mechanism of 
social learning. The third ingredient is the thing passed on, the content, which they describe as 
“transmitted information.” It is rather cumbersome to define culture in terms of outcome, 
mechanism, and content. Is this complexity necessary or can we perhaps jettison some of the 
ingredients? As mentioned above, group typicality is not a desired criterion for culture since it 
eliminates any cultural variants that are not group-typical, and there is nothing necessary about 
culture that makes it have to be typical of—or common in—the group. It might, then, be 
tempting to eliminate this criterion and have culture be defined not in terms of particular kinds of 
outcomes, but instead in terms of mechanism and content only. Thus, one might think that 
culture should be defined simply as socially transmitted information.  
 But to expunge group typicality would be to miss the point that it is inserted into the 
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definition to solve a problem. The problem is that not all information that organisms transmit 
from one another constitutes culture. Some is mere ephemeral communication—it has an effect 
on the recipient but not a lasting one or not one capable of supporting traditions. An alarm call 
may allow a macaw to learn of an approaching eagle from a conspecific, but what is socially 
learned by the macaw about the eagle’s proximity is not something that forms the basis of a 
tradition. Similarly, one howling wolf might set the pack howling, but this is not the kind of 
behavior that is considered cultural. There thus must be a restriction in place, but one that does 
not require group typicality. I will turn to the question of a replacement restriction in the 
following section, but let’s first consider the other two components, mechanism and content.  
 Social learning is a component of Laland and Janik’s definition and is a common feature 
of culture definitions. Unfortunately, there are some difficulties with the social learning criterion. 
As Sterelny (2009) argues, “it is far from clear that there is a distinctive and identifiable form of 
learning, social learning, that contrasts with (say) individual trial-and-error learning in response 
to ecological circumstances” (295). And while social learning may be important for culture, it 
does not suffice for culture. McGrew (2009), for example, holds that “if culture equals social 
learning, then many creatures, e.g., octopus, guppy, and lizard, must be granted cultural status. If 
culture is more than social learning, then we must look elsewhere for essential criteria. On these 
grounds, it seems sensible to consider social learning as necessary but not sufficient for culture” 
(50). McGrew is certainly correct that social learning is not sufficient for culture. And social 
learning—or something like it—is necessary. The reason that social learning is a ubiquitous 
ingredient in definitions of culture is that cultural traditions are sustained by the information that 
is passed on from one individual to another through behavioral performances. Thus, we need not 
worry about what, precisely, counts as social learning, and can sidestep the issues raised by 
Sterelny. We can do so by simply recognizing that for information to be cultural, it must be 
transmitted from one individual to another via a behavioral channel.  
 The final ingredient is the content, what Laland and Janik label information. I agree with 
them that defining culture in terms of information is a good strategy. But one should be cautious. 
The term ‘information’ is used in a variety of ways—leaving it unspecified can lead to vacuity, 
while giving a detailed specification can lead to problems (Lewens 2014). But for the purpose of 
animal culture, what we want from a concept of information is the reduction of uncertainty. By 
this I don’t mean the feeling of uncertainty and its associated anxiety. Instead, if there are 
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multiple ways for, say, a rat to extract seeds from pinecones, and that through the behavioral 
transfer of information, the number of ways that the rat might use is reduced (down to one, 
perhaps), then the uncertainty concerning seed extraction has been reduced. Similarly, in a shell 
game, you gain information about the hidden item by lifting one of the shells to the extent that 
the uncertainty in the item’s whereabouts is reduced by seeing what is under a particular shell. 
This notion of information is what Dretske (1983) used and developed, and is related to the 
mathematical accounts of information arising from Shannon and Weaver (Shannon 1948; 
Shannon and Weaver 1949).  
 
What animal culture is 
Let’s take stock of the ingredients. Laland and Janik are right that outcome, mechanism, and 
content are all important ingredients in a concept of animal culture, but there were difficulties 
with their specific interpretation of these. Let’s begin with the last and work backward. 
Information, suitably defined, seems to be an important part of a definition of culture. In fact, I 
would go further to argue that culture is information—it is a particular kind of information. The 
other two ingredients are not a part of what culture is, but instead are what help to delimit the 
kind of information that is culture. The second ingredient, mechanism, is an important way of 
delimiting this information, though since we are considering the flow of information, the term 
‘channel’ may be more apt. Culture, then, is information transmitted from person to person (or 
between groups of people, since there may be some forms of cultural information that no 
individual possesses, but is possessed and transmitted by a group) along a particular kind of 
channel. The channel that the information must pass through is behavior—it must be transmitted 
by behavior and not, say, by genes. Thus, taking into account the last two ingredients, we can 
produce a preliminary, incomplete definition of culture as information transmitted between 
individuals or groups, where this information flows through the behavior.  
 From the above example of wolf howl contagion or the startling precipitated by an alarm 
call, it is clear that not all information that is passed through behavior between individuals or 
groups is culture. Instead, the outcome the information has is important for whether it is truly 
culture. In particular, the information must help to bring about the reproduction of the behavior 
that serves as a channel for the information, and it must have a lasting effect on the behavior of 
the recipient(s). This idea of culture causing, passing through, and reproducing behavior is not 
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too far from what Kroeber and Kluckhohn were getting at when they held that “culture systems 
may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other hand, as conditioning 
elements of further action” (1952: 357). We can now, following Ramsey (2013), put together the 
three ingredients into one definition: Culture is information transmitted between individuals or 
groups, where this information flows through and brings about the reproduction of, and a lasting 
change in, the behavioral trait. 
 This definition has each of the three ingredients that are common in definitions of culture. 
But the definition offered here avoids the requirement that culture bring about behavioral 
homogeneity, and instead of using the somewhat vague and controversial concept of social 
learning, it simply specifies the channel through which the information must flow in order for it 
to count as culture. The definition also does not predetermine which taxa exhibit culture. If 
guppies, lizards, or octopuses transfer information amongst themselves in such a way that it 
flows through and brings about the reproduction of, and a lasting change in, a behavioral trait, 
then it is a cultural species. The question of whether or not this concept of culture applies to such 
taxa has an answer based on empirical evidence, not stipulation.  
 
Culture, environment, and epigenetics 
Cultural transmission, as defined here, is certainly distinct from genetic transmission, and 
cultural explanations of behavioral differences are distinct from and complementary to genetic 
explanations of difference. Environment, however, is not so easily or cleanly distinguished from 
culture. The reason is that there can be cultural artifacts and these artifacts can help furnish the 
environment. This implies that environment, genes, and culture do not represent three mutually 
exclusive sources of behavioral differences. Instead, environment is divided into cultural 
environment and acultural environment.  
 How, then, can part of the environment such as an artifact be cultural given the definition 
of culture provided above? The answer is that while culture necessarily flows through behavior, 
it can flow through other material things as well. A spear point is a result of behavior, but it can 
also serve as a channel for cultural information. One can learn some of how to build spear points 
through the examination of points fashioned by others. Thus, some of the uncertainty in how to 
build a particular kind of point is reduced through the inspection of such points. Objects become 
channels for information when they help recapitulate in others the behavior that shaped them. 
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Similarly, animal trails can be cultural artifacts—they decrease the uncertainty of their 
conspecific’s walking behavior, and by walking on them they help to induce like behavior in 
others. The fact that environment and culture overlap does not mean that it is wrong to 
operationalize the detection of culture by eliminating environmental and genetic differences. 
Instead, what one needs to exclude in such assessments are features of the environment 
fashioned by individuals via cultural behavior. But in studies of culture in animals, this is 
typically done. For example, if orangutans on one side of a river eat a fruit that a group on the 
other side does not, what one looks for is whether the fruit is growing on both sides in a similar 
density and in areas that are similarly accessible.  
 Where things become more difficult is when there is a significant degree of niche 
construction (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). Niche construction occurs when organisms modify their 
environment in a way that can have ecological and evolutionary effects. Beavers building dams 
is a classic example—the result of their construction creates ponds, and swimming in the ponds 
they have constructed modifies their selection pressures. But such behavior is not cultural just 
because it involves niche construction. While there can be cultural niche construction, much 
niche construction occurs in the absence of culture. The litmus test for whether a part of the 
environment is cultural is whether its form and/or function is in part the result of a behavior, and 
whether its having this form and/or function leads others to reproduce in the environment a 
similar form or function.  
 Just as culture, as defined above, can flow outside of our bodies, it can also flow inside 
and can even affect how genes are transcribed. Being licked by one’s mother affects a rat pup’s 
epigenetics (Weaver et al. 2004). Rats that are licked as pups are therefore differently constituted 
and may therefore behave differently. If being licked as a female pup makes the rat tend to lick 
her own pups once she matures and eventually has offspring, then this licking behavior is 
cultural behavior. The licking behavior is traditional and could be disrupted by an intervention in 
which mother rats were prevented from licking their pups. Thus, even though the licking 
behavior is in part mediated by epigenetics, it is cultural nevertheless.  
 Culture and epigenetics are sometimes viewed as alternative ways to explain patterns of 
behavior. For example, Jablonka and Lamb (2005) distinguish epigenetic and behavioral 
inheritance mechanisms and place culture within behavioral inheritance only. But under the 
framework provided here, culture can flow through an epigenetic channel. It therefore follows 
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that culture and epigenetics—like culture and the environment—overlap and are not alternative, 
mutually exclusive ways of explaining behavioral patterns.  
In a similar way, passing on dietary preferences in utero or through milk can count as 
culture (Galef and Sherry 1973). If the feeding behavior of the mother is reproduced in the 
young—that is, the dietary uncertainty of the offspring is reduced by the maternal diet—then 
cultural information flows through the mother’s behavior, into her gut, and via biochemical 
channels to her offspring. Such pathways, like cultural niche construction, can be long and 
tortuous but, according to the framework provided here, count as culture.  
 
Criteria for recognizing culture in animals 
Given the definition of culture offered here, it is natural to ask what observable criteria can serve 
as evidence of culture. In answering this question, let’s consider an influential way of testing for 
culture, that of McGrew (1992), to see how it compares to this definition. Instead of simply 
defining what culture is, McGrew offers a set of operational criteria that one can use to 
determine whether culture is present. He offers eight criteria, which he takes to be individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient for a species to be cultural: innovation, dissemination, 
standardization, durability, diffusion, tradition, non-subsistence, and naturalness. Let’s consider 
each in turn. 
 Innovation is described by McGrew as a “new pattern is invented or modified” (1992, p. 
77). There is a growing literature on animal innovation (Reader and Laland 2003) and there is 
debate concerning how, precisely, we should understand the concept. It is clear that innovation 
can occur in the absence of culture and if, as McGrew argues, innovation is a necessary 
condition, then culture cannot exist without innovation.  Using the framework provided by 
Ramsey, Bastian, and van Schaik (2007), while innovation may be the prime source of 
behavioral novelty, it may not be necessary for such novelty. Instead, mistakes can lead to 
behavioral novelty, or novel behaviors can be induced by the environment, and this novelty can 
be transmitted as a cultural tradition. Thus, it wrong to define culture in terms of innovation, but 
it may not be wrong to use innovation as an indicator of culture, since there is a good chance that 
they are empirically highly correlated.  
 Dissemination is described as “pattern acquired by another from innovator” (1992, p. 77). 
Because, as I just argued, there is no definitional link between innovation and culture, I think it is 
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wrong to define dissemination in terms of innovation. That said, because the flow of information 
in culture transmission is a form of dissemination, I agree with McGrew that dissemination—
defined differently—is a necessary condition.  
 Standardization is described as “form of pattern is consistent and stylized” (1992, p. 77). 
To the degree that cultural information is conveyed from one individual to another behavioral 
standardization will ensue. Thus standardized behavior patterns will be a part of any cultural 
system. That said, consistent behavior patterns may be present with or without culture. Thus, 
such patterns by themselves bear scant evidence for culture.  
 Durability is described as “pattern performed outwith presence of demonstrator” (1992, 
p. 77). Durability here plays a similar role as that played by the “lasting change” in the 
behavioral trait, as described above. If the information has a lasting change on behavior, then it 
will be durable, it will be performed in the absence of the demonstrator.  
 Diffusion is described as “pattern spreads from one group to another” (1992, p. 77). 
While cultural species will often exhibit diffusion, I do not agree that one should take it to be a 
necessary condition for culture. There could be species that exist in isolated groups, and that if a 
foreign individual is accepted into the group, it is required to adopt the cultural norms of the 
group. In such a species, culture and cultural evolution are possible in the absence intergroup of 
diffusion. That said, diffusion of behavior is an indication of culture and should thus be 
understood not as a criterion for culture, but instead as evidence of culture.  
 Tradition is described as “patterns persist from innovator’s generation to the next one” 
(1992, p. 77). Like diffusion, tradition is a natural consequence of culture: culture spreads from 
individual to individual, and it is highly probable that many cultural variants will have models 
from an older generation. That said, is tradition in this transgenerational sense necessary for 
culture? The framework introduced above implies that culture can (and should) be defined 
independently of tradition in this sense. Some cultural variants could sweep through a 
generation, causing lasting changes in their behavior, but die out within that generation. In 
humans, we would not deny a particular fashion trend to be cultural just because nobody under 
thirty would be caught dead dawning it. Similarly, one could imagine species whose culture is 
always confined within a generation. Such a species may be improbable, but is not impossible. 
Thus tradition—as defined by McGrew—is an indicator of culture (since culture is almost 
always associated with traditions), not a necessary condition. 
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 Non-subsistence is described as “pattern transcends subsistence” (1992, p. 77). This is a 
condition McGrew added so that culture is present in realms outside of subsistence. For 
chimpanzees, he offers an example of males from one cultural community tearing up leaves 
during courtship. Like many of the criteria offered by McGrew, I take this one to be empirically 
correlated with culture, but not a necessary condition for culture. A species could have all of its 
cultural variants be related to subsistence. 
 Naturalness is described as “pattern shown in absence of direct human influence” (1992, 
p. 77). The definition of culture offered above requires that the cultural information must flow 
through the behavior in bringing about culture in others. Thus, if humans change the 
environment of an animal, thereby changing its behavior, we should not regard this as culture. 
Although this is true, if a nonhuman animal learns a behavior from a human, but this animal goes 
on to serve as a model for conspecifics, the “artificial” behavior could become a cultural norm 
for the species.  
 In sum, the criteria offered by McGrew are, for the most part, indicators of culture as 
defined above. His intent was to offer empirically observable, measurable criteria and, as such, 
his list does a good job pointing to criteria that indicate culture. But these criteria, however, 
should not be understood as a constituting a definition of culture. If we ask what is animal 
culture? then the definition offered in the “What animal culture is” section is a good answer. But 
if we ask what are reliable signs of culture? then the criteria discussed in this section are a good 
answer.  
 
Conclusions 
The framework provided here accords well with standard practice in the science of animal 
culture. The common method of discovering behaviors that differ across ecologically similar 
geographic areas will pick out many cultural variants, though it will leave some undetected. Even 
if all human groups begin playing the banjo, banjo playing should still count as a cultural 
behavior. Similarly, it is possible for animal species to have cultural universals. Searching for 
behavioral differences not linked to environmental or genetic differences should thus be a 
starting point, not a decisive test. Instead, using the definition of culture elaborated above, we 
should ask whether the behavioral pattern is maintained by information transmitted via 
performances of the behavior in others. 
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 The benefit of using the concept of culture here is that it will help us to be clear about 
what animal culture is and what it takes for a species to be cultural. And it allows us to keep 
clear about the difference between culture itself and the operational criteria one should use to 
search for and quantify culture. As we have seen, of the criteria offered by McGrew are, for the 
most part, reliable indicators of culture. In refining these criteria and developing new ones, one 
can use the definition offered here, asking the question of what observations can reliably indicate 
culture in this sense. 
 The conception of culture articulated here is inclusive—any species that uses information 
in the way described exhibits cultural behaviors. Despite this openness, the conception 
nevertheless does justice to much of what counts as culture in humans. Patterns of human 
behavior—languages, techniques, rituals, etc.—are maintained by culture. Some normative 
aspects of culture, or features linked to class (high vs. low culture), are not a part of culture as 
conceived here. But this is a strength, not a weakness, since it allows animals to be cultural in the 
purely informational sense, but also allows culture to be elaborated, supplemented, and 
transformed into the richly symbolic, normative world of humans.  
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Chicago Press, 2004) is about human evolution, but these are also insightful for understanding 
culture in animals. 
